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Abstract 
The procurement of commercial items presents both opportunities and challenges for 
the Department of Defense. Among the challenges is the negotiation of “fair and 
reasonable” prices with suppliers where competitive sources are not relevant. This paper 
presents analyses to address this challenge for commercial aircraft that serve as the basis 
for military systems. Using insights from the economics literature on aspects of the 
commercial aircraft market, we develop estimating models for aircraft price that take into 
account both supply and demand drivers, across both aircraft models and time. These 
models are applied to the KC-46A airborne tanker program, prices of which are subject to 
negotiation. Other factors affecting the commercial aircraft market and aircraft used in these 
programs (Boeing variants) are also addressed. Lessons learned applicable to the general 
problem of negotiation of contracts for commercial items are enumerated.  
Background 
The procurement of commercial items presents both opportunities and challenges for 
the Department of Defense (DoD). Among the challenges is the negotiation of “fair and 
reasonable” prices with suppliers where competitive sources do not exist. The Institute for 
Defense Analyses (IDA) has performed a series of studies developing estimating 
relationships for the prices of commercial aircraft, variants of which figure in DoD acquisition 
programs (Harmon, Sullivan, & Davis, 2010). Unlike in the case of purpose-built military 
aircraft, DoD negotiators generally do not have access to the underlying costs or cost 
estimating relationships derived from historical costs for analogous items. Buying 
commercial aircraft is substantially different from buying military aircraft or commodity items 
from other types of commercial suppliers. Lessons learned from this past rese arch can 
help inform current Air Force negotiations on the prices of current and future systems; of 
particular interest is the KC-46A program. The lessons learned also have implications for the 
broader portfolio of the DoD’s commercial items purchases, particularly those bought in thin 
markets, and/or markets dominated by sellers with market power where competitive 
sourcing is not relevant. 
The Economics of the Commercial Aircraft Market 
The market for commercial aircraft with a range greater than 3,000 nautical miles 
(NM) is currently a duopoly, with Boeing and Airbus the only producers. In a duopoly such 
as this, the participants have a degree of market power not evident in more competitive 
markets. The suppliers’ choice of quantity (price) has an effect on market price (quantity 
demanded), as each supplier contributes a large part to industry output. Also, given learning 
in the aircraft industry, the choice of quantity for a given time period affects costs in future 
time periods. This combination of attributes means that for any given product line and time 
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period, price can be below marginal cost (startup period)1 or above marginal cost (mature 
program). In addition, given market power (the supplier faces a downward sloping demand 
curve), price discrimination is also evident. This contrasts with a competitive market in which 
all firms are price takers; the cost of production for any given firm does not affect the market 
price. All of these factors contribute to the difficulty in arriving at fair and reasonable prices 
for commercial aircraft. 
Overview of the Literature 
These observations are drawn from substantial academic literature on the economics 
of the commercial aircraft industry, presented in Harmon et al. (2010), in which price 
determination is an important aspect of much of the research. This literature provides 
important insights regarding potential drivers of aircraft price levels and movements over 
time. These studies show that, although learning will not affect purchase price to the degree 
evident in a contracting environment—as in the military aircraft procurement, where prices 
are negotiated based on cost—there still can be some effect (Baldwin & Krugman, 1988; 
Benkard, 2004; Irwin & Pavcnik, 2004). This should be true for anything that affects the cost 
structure of the industry or a given product line. For example, estimated price increases that 
followed the 1992 reduction in government subsidies were coincident with calculated 
increases in producer costs (Irwin & Pavcnik, 2004). Other possible cost drivers that could 
show up in price include labor productivity, secular trends, and cyclical movements. Some 
fixed costs will be “quasi-fixed”—portions of labor inputs that are sticky relative to production 
rate. This was noted in Kronemer and Henneberger (1993), a Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) study of labor productivity in the aircraft industry. The BLS found that labor 
productivity was highly procyclical—higher output measures were associated with higher 
productivity growth as quasi-fixed portions of labor were spread over more units. Their data 
also show a longer-term upward trend in labor productivity of 1.5% to 2.5% per year. 
Modeling Approaches  
The models of the aircraft industry presented in the economics literature have, by 
necessity, been abstracted from a complex reality. They have at least four things in 
common:  
 Use of a multi-period dynamic framework;  
 Rules guiding the strategic behavior of suppliers in a duopoly/oligopoly situation 
in which game-theoretic approaches are used to solve for industry equilibrium;  
 Inclusion of learning curves in the supply functions of the firms, while taking into 
account the dynamic effects of learning on firm decisions; and  
 Demand relations reflecting the derived demand of aircraft as an input to the 
production of air services.  
All the models take the manufacturers as value maximizers over an extended time 
horizon where the value function is, assuming a homogeneous product, for firm j,  
                                                
 
 
1  Due to learning-by-doing, the first quantity produced has a very high cost. Prices in the 
startup period are usually observed to be below marginal costs. 
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where Vj is the net present value for firm j, R is a discount factor and pjt, qjt, and cjt 
are the relevant price, quantity, and marginal cost.2 Modifications to this basic setup were 
made by the different researchers to reflect additional assumptions. The firms’ strategic 
behavior is portrayed either as quantity setting (Cournot game) or price setting (Bertrand 








, and current and future costs, through the learning curve. In the 
Bertrand game, choosing pjt will affect qjt, which in turn will affect future costs through the 
learning curve. The models vary in complexity and realism. For the simplest model, stated in 
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
 , (2) 
where ct is the marginal cost of the aircraft, zt is the shadow value of current 
production arising from reductions in future costs due to learning, s is the market share of 
the subject firm, and E is the demand elasticity (E > 0).3 
Example Program: KC-46A 
In the KC-46A program, government-funded development includes the creation of a 
new minor model of the 767, the 767-2C, which was not previously available to commercial 
customers. The 767-2C includes a combination of features available in other Boeing 
commercial aircraft, including freighter floors and doors, convertible passenger capability, an 
upgraded cockpit, and higher maximum take-off weight (MTOW). In addition, tanker mission 
system provisions are also incorporated; although these features were not available on 
previous Boeing commercial aircraft, they are “of a type” changes that commercial 
customers might specify (e.g., added provisions for non-standard buyer-furnished 
equipment [BFE]). Boeing has applied for a Federal Aviation Administration “amended type 
certificate” (ATC) for the 767-2C. Given the ATC, the 767-2C will be commercially available 
to other customers. All of these factors add challenges to the negotiation of fair and 
reasonable prices, as pricing history for direct commercial analogs do not exist. The effects 
of these challenges are mitigated by an acquisition strategy in which the initial competition 
between suppliers (resulting in the choice of Boeing over Airbus in February 2011) provided 
for price discovery. The award covered a Fixed-Price Incentive Firm contract for Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development along with Firm Fixed Price contract options for Low Rate 
                                                
 
 
2  The definition of marginal cost in most of this literature is not the cost of the last aircraft built 
during the time increment, but the average cost over that time period, implying the inclusion of recurring 
fixed costs.  
3  Denote demand with x. The price elasticity of demand is – (∆x/∆p) (p/x), which measures 
the percentage change in demand in response to a 1% change in price.  
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Initial Production Lots 1 and 2, and Not-to-Exceed (NTE) contract options with an Economic 
Price Adjustment (EPA) clause for Full Rate Production Lots 3 through 13 (DoD, 2016). It is 
at Lot 3 (FY 2017) where negotiation becomes relevant. 
Modeling Commercial Aircraft Prices 
We use least-squares regression techniques to define and test specifications of the 
price estimating relationships. Prices are treated as dependent variables and related to 
independent variables, which we hypothesize to be price drivers. In the case of least-
squares regressions, the functions are defined by parameter estimates on the independent 
variables, determined by minimizing the squared errors of the regression line from the actual 
data. The price estimating relationships take on the multiplicative form:  
 j
u
jj exfp ),(  , (3) 
where pj is the value of the observed price for aircraft j, xj is the vector of 
independent variables,  is the vector of parameter estimates, and uj is the error term. 
Without loss of generality, assume that the equation takes on the intrinsically linear form 




1  , (4) 
and then OLS regression techniques can be applicable. To do this, the equation is 
transformed to a log-log form: 
 .)ln()ln()ln()ln( 2110 jjjj uDxp    (5) 
OLS will produce parameter estimates of b0 ≡ ln(β0), b1 ≡ β1, and b2 ≡ ln(β2). Both β0 and β2 
can be recovered by taking an anti-logarithmic transformation of b0 and b2 (i.e., by 
calculating 𝑒  and 𝑒 . The parameter estimate b1 has a natural interpretation of elasticity, 
measuring the percentage change in price with respect to a 1% change in x1. The parameter 
b2 represents a change in price (∆pj/pj) when the dummy variable switches its value from 0 
to 1.  
When describing the estimating relationships, information presented includes R2, 
adjusted R2, the standard error of the estimate (𝜎), and the t-statistics (which are the ratios 
of the parameter estimates to their standard errors), as well as associated levels of 
statistical significance for each of the parameter estimates. We generally exclude variables 
whose parameter estimates are not significant at the 0.1 level, although some exceptions 
are made. In a linear model, R2 measures the proportion of the total variance in the data 
explained by the model. Although this is not strictly true for most of our models because they 
are nonlinear, the R2 analog provides useful information about the relative fit of the models. 
Adjusted R2 presents this information adjusted for the number of independent variables in 
the regression. R2 and adjusted R2 are calculated from the data and model after they are 
transformed back from log space to arithmetic space. 𝜎 is calculated in log space; it can be 
converted into minus/plus percentages of price in the original space by calculating values for 
𝑒 1 and 𝑒 1. Measures derived from the standard errors provide information 
regarding the uncertainty of the estimates.  
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Data 
The IDA team used data from airline industry consultants to build price estimating 
relationships for commercial aircraft. Airlines and manufacturers withhold transaction price 
information from public release, and Department of Transportation transaction price data for 
contemporary experience are not available. Although list prices are available on Boeing and 
Airbus websites, aircraft are generally sold at a substantial discount from list. The airline 
consultants estimate prices for a variety of clients including aircraft purchasers, lessors, 
insurers, and investors. They are coy about their estimating methods; they seem to 
extrapolate from a limited number of actual data points (often from their clients) based on 
financial valuation models.  
IDA’s previous analysis of the KC-767 purchase price (Nelson et al., 2003) noted 
uncertainties associated with reported aircraft price data: 
The complexity of the transactions comes from two sources: the variation in 
content from one sale to another, and the nature of the contractual 
arrangements involved. Both sources of complexity make it difficult to 
interpret any known historical sales prices.  
The content included in a given sale may on the one hand include spare 
parts, training, and maintenance support. On the other hand, the sales price 
may not include buyer furnished equipment such as interiors, in-flight 
entertainment, seats and galleys. Additionally, 767 aircraft, like most 
commercial models, are sold with a wide range of features such as upgraded 
avionics, engines, fuel capacities, maximum gross takeoff weight and cargo 
handling systems. 
This uncertainty was addressed for 767 pricing by collecting data from multiple 
sources, representing multiple years and transactions. This general strategy was expanded 
to the broader commercial aircraft market by statistically defining price estimating 
relationships. The goal was to abstract from the available data some reference value for a 
given aircraft model based on the consultants’ pricing data, regardless of the conditions of 
specific transactions or possible measurement error associated with the individual data 
points used. The regression analyses employed generated the expected values of prices 
conditioned on measures of aircraft utility and other price drivers. The statistical analyses in 
turn provided measures of estimation error that partially reflect uncertainties in the data. 
IDA price estimating research was first performed in 2009 to 2010 in Harmon et al. 
(2010) using data from Airline Monitor, AVITAS, and Morten Beyer & Agnew (MBA). These 
data included reported prices through 2009. The AVITAS and MBA data showed similar 
prices for the same aircraft model, while the Airline Monitor data showed consistently higher 
prices, particularly for wide-body (WB) aircraft. Also, Airline Monitor’s time series data 
showed almost no price variability between years, and price data for discontinued aircraft 
models were reported after they ceased delivery. As AVITAS did not include time series 
data by aircraft model, we chose to update only the MBA data; the updated data used in 
modeling included reported prices through January 2016. MBA presented “Base Value” and 
“Current Market Price” data—in most cases the two values were the same, but when they 
were different, we used the Current Market Price value. Prices were for typical airline 
configurations, including interiors/BFE.  
Table 2 shows the coverage by year for the MBA data used in the regression modeling. 
Note that there was a gap in data reporting in 2010 and 2011. 
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Table 2. Data Coverage 
Manufacturer Aircraft Years in 2010 Study Additional Years in 
2016 Update 
Airbus A330-200 1998–2009 2012–2016 
A330-300 1996–2009 2012–2016 
A330-300F NA 2014–2016 
A380-800 N/A 2012–2016 
Boeing 737-600 1998–2006 N/A 
737-700 1998–2009 2012–2016 
737-800 1998–2009 2012–2016 
737-900 2001–2005 N/A 
737-900ER 2006–2009 2012–2016 
747-8 N/A 2012–2016 
747-F N/A 2016 
767-200ER 1988–1991, 2000–2007 N/A 
767-300ER 1988–2009 2012–2013 
767-300F NA 2014–2016 
767-400ER 2000–2002 N/A 
777-200 1995–2006 N/A 
777-200ER 1997–2009 2012–2014 
777-200LR 2007–2009 2012–2014 
777-300 1998–2006 NA 
777-300ER 2005–2009 2012–2016 
777F NA 2014–2016 
787-8 N/A 2012–2014 
787-9 N/A 2016 
 
All dollar amounts are measured in calendar year (CY) 2016 dollars. The inflation 
adjustment is made using the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator as reported by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The effect of other economic factors (fuel price, 
world GDP, cumulative aircraft quantity) are weighted based on estimates from panel data 
analyses that are described later.  
Aircraft characteristics used as cost drivers in the regressions were open source data 
obtained primarily from the aircraft manufacturers’ websites. Price drivers were aircraft 
characteristics fixed over time reflecting utility to airlines. Different independent variables 
and subsets of data were included in the resulting price estimating relationships. Either 
MTOW, Seats and Range (Seat Miles4), or Payload was used as the primary driver. These 
drivers are presented graphically for the aircraft in the data sample in Figure 1.  
 
                                                
 
 
4  Seat Miles is a measure of an aircraft’s passenger-carrying capacity. It is equal to the 
number of seats available multiplied by the maximum range in miles.  
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Figure 1. MTOW and Seat Miles for Commercial Aircraft Sample 
 
Data can be further broken down by aircraft model. An aircraft model is introduced, 
manufactured, and phased out over time. Therefore, a given model is usually observed in 
multiple years over a specific range of years. Some drivers change over time and model. For 
example, the variables representing and measuring utility (demand) and cost (supply) affect 
prices over time. The economics literature informs our choice of independent variables.  
Pooled OLS Models  
Our data were a mix of cross-section (data by aircraft model) and time series (for a 
given model). The time series data sample included observations from 1988 to 2016, 
covering periods that vary by model; the data ranges are shown in Table 2. Our empirical 
regression took the logarithmic form: 
 pjt = zj +xjt+jt , (6) 
where the j subscript indexed each model, zj was a vector containing a constant term 
and variables for each model that are fixed over time, and xjt was a vector of regressors that 
varied over model and time.  
In terms of the price estimating model, the aircraft-model-specific variables fixed over 
time (e.g., Seat Miles and MTOW) were contained in zj, while the xjts were the economic 
variables that changed over time and model (including delivery quantities to capture 
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used to estimate the model (Greene, 2002). Given positive diagnostics regarding zj, we 
chose to estimate the price estimating relationships using OLS.5 
For the aircraft model-specific variables (the zjs) we found either Seats and Range or 
MTOW to be statistically significant. The MTOW specification allowed us to include freighter 
aircraft in the sample. The MTOW model showed a substantially better fit than the Seats and 
Range model. One reason for this may be the ambiguity regarding seating configurations for 
the passenger aircraft. We also tried different combinations and transformations of the 
constituents of MTOW (e.g., empty weight, weights for payload and fuel), but we found that 
MTOW fit the best. For the updated data sample, we did not find a freighter effect.  
For the economic variables, we experimented with different time lags and forms of 
world GDP growth (International Monetary Fund, 2016), fuel prices (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, n.d.), delivery rates, and aircraft cumulative quantity, as well as a time trend. 
As there were already substantial correlations between time, cumulative aircraft quantity, 
and fuel price, we used the de-trended series for GDP growth. 
The net effect of market cycles on aircraft prices is an interesting empirical question. 
There is a supply-side argument that higher production rates would mean lower unit costs 
and prices.6 The demand-side argument is that higher economic growth would raise the 
utility of aircraft to the airlines and prices would rise. Although these are two different effects, 
they were highly correlated with one another in the data. We found that higher GDP growth 
is associated with higher prices, and that measures of delivery rate were either statistically 
insignificant when entered with GDP growth or carried the same sign. In the end, we chose 
de-trended world real GDP growth, lagged two years, to capture the effect of market cycles 
on prices.  
The impact of other xjts were not ambiguous, as the demand and supply/cost effects 
were more clearly delineated. Fuel price was a demand-side driver, where higher fuel prices 
were expected to result in lower aircraft prices. Higher cumulative quantities should result in 
lower costs and prices. Long-term increases in productivity should lead to lower real prices 
over time for a given aircraft capability.  
For our preferred baseline pooled OLS regression, we identified five price drivers: 
maximum takeoff weight (MTOWj), cumulative quantity (CumQ_L1jt), de-trended world real 
GDP growth rate (WGDP_L2jt), fuel price (FuelP_L1jt), and calendar year (Yearjt), each of 
which is measured as explained below: 
 MTOWj is described above;  
 4Enginesj is a dummy taking 1 if model j is a four-engine aircraft and 0 if it is a 
two-engine aircraft; 
                                                
 
 
5  Although there was evidence in the regression results that assumptions required for OLS to 
be the best unbiased linear estimator were violated (unequal error variances across 
panels/heteroskedasticity and correlation of errors across time within each panel/serial correlation), 
we judged alternatives to address these problems (generalized least squares or the use of cluster 
robust standard errors) inappropriate, given our data sample. 
6  There were also offsetting supply-side arguments; production spikes may be associated 
with increased prices for inputs and increasing marginal costs. 
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 CumQ_L1jt is the cumulative quantity for the aircraft family associated with 
aircraft model j at the end of the prior year;  
 WGDP_L2jt is world real GDP growth expressed as percentage deltas from the 
trend and lagged two years, where the trend is established using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997); 
 FuelP_L1jt is the real price of jet fuel lagged one year; and  
 Yearjt is the calendar year associated with each model j and time t.  
When estimating the model, we included a dummy variable for WB aircraft, along with 
an interaction term with the MTOWi variable. This resulted in a unique slope coefficient on 
MTOWi as well as a different intercept for WB. This meant a separate model estimated for 
each of WB and narrow-body (NB) aircraft, as shown in the specification presented in Error! 
Reference source not found.. Variations on both the MTOW and Seat Miles pooled OLS 
models included production rate for each aircraft family as an additional independent 
variable. Our estimated models follow (standard errors are included under the parameter 
estimates):  
 For WB aircraft: 
 ln(pjt) = 13.01+1.147 ln(MTOWj)−0.253 (4Enginesj) − 0.031 ln(CumQ_L1jt) 
                        (.140)                      (.039)                       (.008) 
           + 1.371 (WGDP_L2jt) – 0.038 (FuelP_L1jt ) −0.011 Yearjt, 
                  (.738)                          (.013)                         (.002) 
 For NB aircraft, the interaction terms result in a unique intercept and MTOW 
coefficient, with the remaining coefficients remaining the same as for WB aircraft: 
 ln(pjt) = 4.37 + 1.907 ln(MTOWj) 
                                                           (.738) 
Error! Reference source not found. compares MBA-reported data points to the 
projected prices using the estimated models.  
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Figure 2. MTOW Panel Data Model 
 
All of the parameter estimates for the preferred model shown in Error! Reference 
source not found. are significantly different from zero at p = .06 or better. Estimates for the 
coefficient on CumQ_L1jt indicate equivalent price improvement curve slopes of 97.9%. This 
is much shallower than typical cost improvement curves and is consistent with the 
economics literature. The estimates on WGDP_L2jt suggest that if world real GDP growth is 
1 percentage point above trend two years prior to aircraft delivery (say, 4.4% versus the 
3.4% growth trend estimated for 2017 using the Hodrick-Prescott filter), the price will be 
1.4% higher than if GDP growth was at trend.  
Estimates for the fuel price coefficients indicated that a $1 per gallon increase in fuel 
price one year prior to aircraft delivery results in a 3.8% decrease in price. The 
reasonableness of this estimate was tested by an approach similar to that taken in Markish 
(2002), where changes in fuel costs were related to changes in discounted life cycle costs 
associated with the aircraft. Predicted changes in aircraft price associated with changes in 
fuel cost were around 10% of the change in the discounted life cycle cost associated with 
the same fuel cost change. This seems reasonable, given that substantial portions of fuel 
price changes will be passed along to airline customers or result in changes in demand for 
seats as opposed to being absorbed by the aircraft manufacturers as price decreases. Also, 
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The time trend parameters on Yearjt indicated a decrease in real prices of 1.1% per 
year. Note that the GDP deflator was used to escalate nominal prices to constant 2016 
dollars. For the recent period, this is consistent with a 1% annual rise in nominal prices.  
Price Discounts From List Price and Boeing Financial Data 
Estimates of transaction prices for commercial aircraft are often expressed as 
discounts from list prices. We calculated discounts from Boeing’s 2016 list prices (which 
were unchanged from the published 2015 values) using both the MBA data and estimated 
prices from the models, including error bounds. An example using the pooled OLS MTOW 
model is shown in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 
  
Figure 3. Discounts From 2016 List Prices: MTOW Model 
 
For the WB aircraft, the average discount for Boeing aircraft was 53% for the MBA 
data and 52% for the MTOW model estimates. Over the entire Boeing portfolios, the 
average discount was 53% for the MBA data and 52% for the MTOW model estimates. For 
the Boeing portfolio, we also calculated weighted average discounts. 
As a means of validating the models and the underlying MBA data, we calculated the 
weighted average discount for Boeing based on their reported financial data and aircraft 
deliveries for 2016. Boeing reported revenue by Segment including Commercial Airplanes 
(BCA), where revenue was booked at aircraft delivery. A small portion of BCA revenue is 
from commercial after-sales support (CAS) and was estimated to be $6.5 billion in 2014 
(Broderick, 2014). Extrapolating this value forward using the annual growth rate from 2011 
to 2014 of 6.4%, we arrived at a value of $7.355 billion for 2016.  
We calculated aircraft sales revenues by subtracting CAS revenues from total BCA 
revenues for 2016: 






























Estimate Plus 1 SE Estimate Minus 1 SE Estimate Reported
 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 335 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
Annual delivery quantities by model (𝑞 ) and list prices by model (
*
jtp ) are 
available for each model from Boeing’s website. Given these values, the weighted average 
















Replacing 𝑅 with the model estimates for each model jtp̂  yielded the estimated 

















D . (8) 
tD̂  varied between 50.2% and 51.3%, depending upon which models were used to 
estimate jtp̂ . When the MBA values were used for jtp̂ , tD̂  = 50.1%. These results give 
some assurance, that at least at the top level, the MBA data and the models are consistent 
with Boeing’s revenue derived from aircraft sales. 
Another important result from the models was the estimated downward trend in real 
transaction prices over the sample period. Boeing applies a weighted average of input price 
inflation rates when escalating list prices from year to year. Given this, and the model 
results, we should expect calculated discounts from list prices to be increasing over time as 
list prices rise at a higher rate than transaction prices. This is what we see where 𝐷  
increased from 34–39% (depending on assumptions regarding CAS revenue) in 2004 to 
52.5% for 2016 as calculated in Equation 7. These additional calculations using publicly 
available Boeing data also confirm modeling results and the underlying data used.  
Example Application: KC-46A 
In this chapter, we apply information from the economics literature, our modeling 
results, and other relevant data to help estimate “fair and reasonable” prices for the 
commercial aircraft platforms used for the KC-46A.  
The KC-46A’s commercial platform, the 767-2C, has features that have no direct 
analog in the commercial aircraft database. Boeing considers the platform to be based on 
the 767-200ER passenger aircraft, even though it has freighter floors and doors associated 
with the longer 767-300F. While the 767-300F is still in production, the last 767-200ER was 
delivered in 2008. The price estimating models do provide some flexibility in producing 
estimates of transaction prices. The model can take into account the implied value to the 
market of some characteristics of the 767-2C, such as the increased MTOW (415,000 lbs. 
versus 396,000 lbs. for the 767-200ER and 413,000 lbs. for the 767-300F).  
The competitive nature of the initial down-select, including NTE prices for production 
lots through the end of the planned program, meant that the fair value of all 767-2C features 
was revealed and should guide future prices. In other situations, one approach to 
addressing the value of like-type features would be to add their cost basis along with a 
representative mark-up to price. The costs could be based on analogies, cost estimating 
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relationships, or cost data from the seller. The government has the right to ask for seller cost 
data, although it need not be TINA-compliant. 
However, the overall market conditions and the specifics of the 767 production that 
were obtained at the time of the 2011 competition (including expectations regarding the 
future) are likely to be different now. The MBA data, price estimating models, and Boeing 
financials show a continuing downward trend in real prices. Also, given additional 767-300F 
orders and deliveries for Federal Express, the overall 767 program is delivering aircraft at a 
rate higher than planned in 2011; given the relationship between cost and price for a mature 




  equilibrium relation, 
and the denominator is less than 1), the delivery rates indicate a lower price, as fixed costs 
are allocated over more units in a given year. 
We are able to capture the overall price trend by applying the pooled OLS model 
using 767-2C characteristics and time series inputs, including projections to 2020. 
Projections for GDP growth and fuel prices are taken from International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) forecasts (2016), while additional deliveries reflect Boeing planned 767 delivery rates 
of two aircraft/month (up from prior values of one aircraft/month). This is shown in  
Error! Reference source not found., along with data and model results from the 767-
200ER, model estimates of the 767-2C, as well as data for the 767-300F. 
 
 
Figure 4. Panel Data Model Estimates for the 767-2C With Comparisons 
The 2016 estimate for the 767-2C is $81.3 million in CY2016 dollars (note that this 
excludes KC-46A-specific provisions that are not captured in the model). Comparing this 
value to the model-predicted 2011 value shows an estimated decrease in price of 1.3%. In 
the case of 2017, the longer-term decrease in real prices is offset by price increases 
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years with estimated prices decreasing to 6% below the 2011 value by 2020.7 This indicates 
that there is room for negotiation below the NTE values determined in the 2011 competition. 
For later lots where the NTEs are subject to adjustment based on an EPA clause, if the price 
trends indicated by the data and model (including evidence from Boeing’s financial data) 
diverge from the price index specified in the EPA clause, there is additional potential to 
negotiate prices below the NTEs (as adjusted by the EPA). 
As mentioned in the description of the regression analyses, we cannot separate out 
the supply-side effects on price of increases in production rates from the demand-side 
effects (GDP growth in our preferred models) using the MBA data. However, given general 
knowledge of aircraft industry cost structures as well as specific information from Boeing’s 
financial reporting, we can analytically derive an estimate of cost effects of the higher 
production rates. The cost/price effects of increased 767 production rates can then be 
approximated by employing a “rate slope” term as estimated in DoD programs where price is 
based on cost.8 Information from Boeing financial statements regarding the cost of reducing 
747 production rates provides a way to calibrate the rate slope model for commercial aircraft 
production. With this information, estimates of unit costs and fixed cost percentages at 
different delivery rates can be calculated. This is shown in Error! Reference source not 
found., where delivery rates from 6/year to 18/year are included, consistent with 2015 
experience and forecasts through 2021. 
 
Figure 5. Unit Cost and Fixed-Cost Percentage Estimates for 747 Production 
 
The curve fitted to the unit costs generalizes the relationship between annual 
quantities and unit costs; it is known as the “rate curve” relation, 
 ct =  qt, (9) 
                                                
 
 
7 This estimate is based on IMF forecasts of the price of Brent crude, which is projected to 
increase from an average of $43/barrel in 2016 to $54/barrel in 2019 (all nominal dollars). 
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where qt is the annual delivery rate. For the 747 example above, the estimated  
coefficient is -.146, corresponding to a 90.4% rate slope; this is within the range of 
parameters estimated for military aircraft programs. 
Taking model-estimated prices for the 767-2C and insights from the above 747 
analyses, we can estimate cost decreases driven by increases in production rates between 
the plan at Boeing’s 2011 bid and the current plan. These differences indicate a 38% steady 
state increase in production rate. Baselining cost values to 767-2C price estimates for 2015 
and applying the 15% margin assumption allows us to generate estimates of cost savings 
associated with the higher production rates. Using the 90.4% rate slope, we estimate annual 
unit cost savings of around $3 million (CY16) for the steady state years (2017 to 2026), 
corresponding to a 2% decrease in cost. 
The 767-2C presents a special case, as price discovery at the time of competition 
between alternative tankers means that there is less uncertainty for future purchases. 
However, we see in the application of our models and other information that there are both 
program-specific factors (higher than previously planned production rates) and overall 
industry trends (increases in nominal prices over time that are less than overall inflation) that 
would indicate prices below the NTEs could be negotiated for future lots. 
The long time horizon for the KC-46A program means that it is important to take into 
account both the effect of general industry pricing trends and changes in the specifics of 767 
production economics. Our analyses of both of these effects indicate that the government 
may be able to pay lower prices than the NTE prices set in the original competition. 
Commercial Aircraft Pricing Lessons Learned  
Commercial Aircraft Pricing Tools 
Price determination by negotiation for commercial items will generally only occur if 
the supporting markets are not purely competitive. In the case of commercial aircraft, the 
market is a duopoly where prices are above those that would be paid if the market were 
purely competitive. The specifics of this market have been explored in some detail in the 
economics literature. The resulting game-theory models are insightful but without much 
empirical gain. We were able to make use of the consultant-reported transaction prices to 
quantify price drivers, both on the demand and supply side of the market, through least-
squares regression analyses. These models explain most of the variance in prices across 
aircraft models and time; utility associated with commercial airline services, moving people 
and goods speedily across long distances, can be proxied effectively by a small number of 
variables, while supply/cost effects can be mostly captured in a few dimensions. An 
important insight from the models and supporting data is the long-run decrease in real 
commercial aircraft prices. This could have an important impact on the pricing of future KC-
46A procurements.  
The models are useful in establishing baseline values for commercial aircraft used by 
the military. In our application of the models to the KC-46A program, we needed additional 
tools and data to address specifics of that program/aircraft. This included cost drivers not 
captured in the models (production rate effects).  
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Implications for Other Commercial Items 
Several steps in the analysis of the commercial aircraft pricing for military 
applications would be relevant in negotiating prices for other commercial items: 
 Understand the market in which the seller operates. This would go beyond 
“market research” and should address market dynamics as described by 
economic theory. 
 Model market prices as they relate to both supply-side (cost) and demand-side 
(utility) drivers. This will be challenging in that most commercial items bought by 
the DoD and subject to price negotiation will not be as homogenous as 
commercial aircraft. 
 Make use of the seller’s publicly available financial data to put available pricing 
data into perspective—and to better understand the seller’s business model. 
 Given the existence of “like-type” modifications to items available on the 
commercial market, it may be advantageous to estimate the discrete costs of 
these modifications.  
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